European Integration and the Vote in EP Elections in Times of Crisis

Ilke TOYGÜR

Autonomous University of Madrid

Abstract:

Do ideas related to European integration influence vote choice in European Parliament elections in times of crisis? Economic crisis, bailout packages, and austerity measures have been the central agenda in Southern European countries for the last few years, and the strong, subsequent decline of trust in European and national institutions has been alarming. Citizens’ dealignment and realignment proved itself important in various demonstrations around Europe. This situation led citizens to cast votes for new political parties, and decreasing the vote share of older mainstream ones. Political scientists have a vivid interest in this topic, and there is an ever-growing literature available on the effects of economic crisis on elections. Voters, as well as political parties, have received a great deal of academic attention. Southern European countries have faced similar implementations of the crisis and congruent regulations from the European Union. However, there are different implications for their party system change and voting behaviour in these countries. Based on the European Election Studies (EES) data for the last three European Parliament elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014 this paper, however, does not find any major traces of EU issue voting.

Key Words: European integration, voting behaviour, issue voting, crisis, Southern Europe

Draft version, comments are very welcomed!

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Introduction

The global economic and financial crisis and its implications have received a lot of attention in political science research over the last few years. Since the beginning of the crisis, representation dynamics and electoral behaviour have been investigated frequently. As many consider this crisis to be one of the most important challenges, which European integration has ever faced, it is important to understand the consequences of it for political orientations and behaviours. In this context, we need to know what has happened specifically in each country, whether or not a country has received some form of financial aid, and what the political consequences are of this period.

Most scholars consider the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008 the beginning of the economic crisis. However, the fall of Bear Stearns in the spring was a clear early warning of what was to come. The economic turmoil came to Europe and spiralled into a sovereign debt crisis. Some members of the European Union (Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain) received financial help. Greece, Portugal and Cyprus had signed bailout agreements –Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) – with the Troika.\(^1\) The name “Troika” – which is the governing body of the public debt crisis of the Eurozone countries consisting of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – began to be heard in daily news all around Europe.

This situation has created a reaction both in debtor and creditor countries. Northerners, aka creditors, are more nationalist than ever, while Southerners, aka debtors, are mainly anti-austerity after years of experience with different economic programs. Some members of the former group has come out as a strong opponent of European integration – it could be said that maybe some had never been fans to begin with – while the latter group has expressed its desire for a “better” European Union, said in a very general manner. This environment has

\(^1\) Greece signed the first MoU in May 2010; the Portuguese one was signed in June 2011. Greece had other one activated in March 2012, followed by the agreement with Cyprus in March 2013.
led to a rise in Eurosceptic vote in many countries (Treib 2014). This type of vote is not only, perhaps not primarily Euro-sceptic in its character. Leftist Eurosceptic votes are motivated by economic and anti-austerity sentiments, while the political right’s vote focuses on nationalist, anti-immigration polarization. Even this is the case there have been a surge of Euro scepticism in some of the most Europhile members of the Union (Clements, Nanou et al. 2014).

To provide some examples of this situation, in the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, the National Front (FN) in France obtained 24.9 per cent of the vote and became the leading party in the EP from France, while the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) received 26.8 per cent of the UK vote. Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany gained 7.1 per cent of German votes and entered the European Parliament, even though it could not make it into its own national parliament because of the 5 per cent threshold.

In the meantime, Southern Europe received lots of attention thanks not only to its economic figures but also to its political developments. In Greece, Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) gained 26.6 per cent of the vote in EP elections and continued its success in the Greek national elections in 2015, obtaining 36.3 and 35.5 per cent respectively in January and September. It is important to underline that Greece has a particular role due to the danger of leaving the Union, a danger that is often referred to as “Grexit”. A “Grexit” could have been a new step in European (dis)integration. In Italy, Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S) received 21.2 per cent of the vote in the 2014 elections. The case of Italy is even more striking since the EU “forced” a government change by placing excessive pressure on the Berlusconi government, which finally led to the election of a technocrat, Mario Monti, as the Prime Minister of the country from 2011 to 2013. Nowadays, Italy seems to be more stable compared with Greece and Spain.

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2 Appendix table 1 demonstrates a list of Eurosceptic parties in Europe. Parties with pro-/anti-integration scores less than five are considered as Eurosceptics.
In the case of Spain, the newly established party Podemos (“We Can”) won 8 per cent of the vote and five seats (among 54 chairs) in the 2014 EP elections. The success of this new party continued in local elections, together with a new rival from the right side of the political spectrum, Ciudadanos (trans. “Citizens”, aka C’s) challenging the two party system in Spain. Today, the mayor of both Barcelona and Madrid come from a coalition led by Podemos. The results of general elections at the end of this year are highly anticipated.

Through all these developments in Greece, Italy, and Spain, Portugal remained mostly immune. Its party system remained stable regardless of the economic turmoil the country has been living in. The Social Democratic Party (PSD), together with Christian democrats (CDS-PP), has been governing the country since 2011, keeping the Socialist Party (PS) as the main opposition. These three parties collectively received 64 per cent of the vote in the 2014 EP elections. In October 2015, Portugal held national elections, with the coalition PaF (Portugal à Frente – Portugal Ahead), formed by the PSD and CDS-PP, leading with 38.6 per cent of the vote, while the main opposition received 32.3 per cent—the results indicating a very close race. Additionally, it is interesting to note that the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda – BE) received some attention from the political scientists during the election period questioning if it can be grouped among more extreme counterparts in Southern Europe, even if it was not the case.

Why is Portugal different? The answer requires a detailed explanation, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in short it is acceptable to conclude that the existing mainstream parties in Portugal have adapted to the changes better than their counterparts in other Southern European countries. There are even some comments claiming that PS favours the discourse of Syriza and Podemos, so there is no space for a more extreme party. The second plausible explanation for this is there is a general lack of interest in politics in Portugal and it is hard to mobilize people.
European Parliament elections are often described as second-order national elections since the very first one (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Many studies prior to the 2009 elections concluded that voting decisions are based on national politics (Schmitt 2005, Hix and Marsh 2007, Hix and Marsh 2011). However recent work suggests a relation between European integration (Euro crisis and austerity measures most frequently) and voting behaviour (Hobolt, Spoon et al. 2009, de Vries, van der Brug et al. 2011, Hobolt and Spoon 2012). This can possibly be caused by the involvement of the European Union, more specifically the Troika, in national politics during the economic crisis.

The EU intervention in national politics triggered a certain blame shifting (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). This mechanism has been used before by national governments frequently. For this reason there is a certain expectation that the effects of the crisis and the EU institutions’ involvement affected the vote choice in the 2014 elections. However, the complex nature of multi-level governance makes it very hard for ordinary citizens to attribute responsibility. In other words, citizens may punish the incumbent for increasing taxes and cutting social expenditures while the true actors behind this are at the European Union level; it is complicated for citizens to hold political actors accountable (Costa Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012). Various studies show that the complex institutional structure in the European Union makes it very hard to define those who are “the responsible” (de Vries, Edwards et al. 2011).

All these considerations raise the following questions: How did the crisis affect voting behaviour in European Parliament elections? Can the rise of Eurosceptic parties be explained by the economic crisis, or do we need to look somewhere else? In this paper, these questions will be assessed using cross-national data from the European Election Studies (2004, 2009, and 2014). Southern European countries, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, are taken as case studies in this work in order to analyse the similarities and differences in their citizens’ responses to the economic crisis.
This paper will assess the economic crisis in Southern Europe, providing necessary information on economic indicators and trust items, as well as a theoretical conceptualization of the issue. Then, a short summary of the data used will be provided, which will be followed by the preliminary results of the models. The findings suggest that there are certain differences in the explanatory power of the EU distance variable when it is relate to the vote. This means that even if the Southern European countries have many similarities regarding the economic crisis, they also have their differences in its reflection on voting behaviour.

The economic crisis in Southern Europe
Stories of the economic crisis in Southern European countries are often linked together because of their similarities. These commonalities, which have been more clear since the beginning of the European debt crisis, are mainly focused on high unemployment rates (especially among young people) and the high level of government debt leading to the increasing tax burden on citizens and further cuts on civil servants and pensioners. Accordingly, cuts in education and science funding are inevitable and will have long-term consequences for these countries.

Historic levels of unemployment have been reached in Southern European countries, especially in Greece (26.5 per cent) and Spain (24.5 per cent). The unemployment rate has been rising dramatically since 2004, as we can see in Figure 1. Even if they are often compared rather than contrasted, there is a strong difference in Italy and Portugal’s positions. Italy, to start, has an unemployment rate between 8 and 12.7 per cent, not exceeding that margin. Portugal, on the other hand, started with a 7.8 per cent unemployment rate in 2004, increasing to 14.1 per cent and then reaching a maximum of 15.8 per cent in 2012.

[Figure 1 about here]
In this period, even the EU28 unemployment rate exceeded 10 per cent, and youth unemployment rate reached 22.2 per cent.\(^3\) This situation demonstrates that unemployment is a very important problem in the EU that still begs a more concrete solution. The last figures in August 2015 show that the unemployment rate is around 9.5 per cent.

When we look at the youth unemployment numbers in Figure 2, they are even more alarming. Both in Greece and in Spain, more than 50 per cent of young people are unemployed. This has been the key complaint behind many demonstrations during the last several years and has been defined as the most important problem by politicians during elections. It was not until very recently that immigration has become the key issue used in electoral campaigns.

Another important indicator of the economic crisis that makes the economy unsustainable in a country is public sector debt. This has been one of the main reasons for the economic crisis in Europe. In some countries, government spending exceeded the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which puts the country under unsustainable foreign debt. When we look at Figure 3, we can observe two paths. The first path is that of Greece and Italy. Both countries have had a public debt level higher than 100 per cent of its GDP for years. The second path, Portugal and Spain, had held their own debt in sustainable levels prior to the economic crisis: however, the situation deteriorated after 2008.

The reasons behind unsustainable budget deficits can vary among countries. A property bubble that converted into a banking system crisis had been the problem in Spain. In Greece, the government debt mainly comes from the size of the public sector, their wages and pensions. It is also underlined that the main reason

\(^3\) Source: Eurostat (2014), unemployment rate for citizens less than 25 years old.
behind the crisis in Europe is the existence of a common currency without a fiscal union, i.e. without common tax, wage, and pension policies. All in all these economic indicators have been very alarming in Southern European countries and have brought various questions to the table.

Southern countries are also known for their pro-European attitude since they have benefited a lot from the structural funds of the EU. In addition, they have seen European integration as a step towards democracy because they all experienced autocratic regimes before EU membership. However, with the economic crisis the public perception of the European Union has deteriorated. Trust levels, not only in EU institutions but also in national institutions, have reached a historic low.

According to Eurobarometer surveys, the gap between trust and mistrust in the EU has been widening over the last years. In Greece, for example, only 17.4 per cent of citizens claimed to trust the EU, while 81 per cent claimed to mistrust it in 2014. Greece has the highest level of mistrust among its Southern European counterparts. However, all four countries have shared this trend since 2009. The highest level of trust amongst Southern European countries is in Portugal where 25.9 per cent of citizens trust the EU, while 70.2 mistrust it.

When we look at national figures, the situation is not different either. There is a historical low in trust in national government, parliament, and political parties. In Figure 5 it can be observed that the trust level in national government is very low, with a high of 13.7 per cent in Portugal. In Greece and Italy this number falls below 10 per cent. In all these countries, more than 85 per cent mistrust the national government.
In an electoral democracy, citizens’ dissatisfaction with the economy, performance of a party, an entire government, and an institution as a whole can be expressed through their vote. In this case, we are expecting that voters attribute responsibility to the EU for the economic situation they are in and find a way to “punish” it. This means that while citizens are voting they should take into consideration the parties’ positions on European integration – i.e. if they support further integration or stepping back. This brings us to the EU issue voting literature.

**Conceptualization of EU issue voting**

With the completion of the Single European Market in 1993 and with the agreement on an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999—which involved the creation of a European Central Bank (ECB) and a common currency (the euro)—the policy influence of the European Union has been magnified. It reaches a large audience not only on economic policies but also on a range of areas, including employment, environment, and immigration policies – very salient issues in politics.

With all these developments in the beginning of 2000s, the gap between political elites and citizens had been extended and European societies started to push back on the elite-driven integration process. The Dutch and French referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty were clear indicators of the end of permissive consensus (Hooghe and Marks 2006, de Vries 2007, Hooghe and Marks 2009). Hooghe and Marks claimed that this permissiveness was converted into a constraining dissensus. Since then, there has been a steady increase in support for Eurosceptic parties, both on the extreme right and the extreme left.

The implications of the economic crisis and austerity measures can be observed from many indicators over the last years. As previously mentioned, this situation has an impact on election results. The role the Troika played in the economic crisis has changed the understanding of the EU for its citizens. The increasing importance of the EU and the impact of its decisions on the daily lives of
European citizens have increased the level of interaction between supranational authorities and the voters. This also prompted national governments to shift the blame of the economic crisis from themselves to the EU.

Because the permissive consensus is no longer existing, we can look at the impact of the EU issue to explain electoral competition. This effect can follow one of two roads: First, this may influence electoral behaviour in European Parliament elections (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, van der Eijk and Franklin 2004) but also in national elections. According to van der Eijk and Franklin, a number of voters have preferences related to the EU; however, they don’t have the platform to express these preferences. In other words, voters think differently about their role in the EU, but there is no suitable choice option supplied by existing political parties. Some authors underline that voters are ready to voice their preferences concerning pro-/anti-European integration; nevertheless, political parties prefer to simplify this view into the left/right dimension, since this dichotomy already exists.

Various scholars have shown that attitudes towards European integration can influence party choice in national elections (Evans 1998, Gabel 2000, Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007, de Vries and Edwards 2009). In her 2007 paper, de Vries investigates EU issue voting in four countries’ national elections (UK, Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany), concluding that EU issue voting is prominent in Denmark and the UK (de Vries 2007). In her paper she argues that EU issue voting is conditional on the degree of EU salience among voters and the extent of partisan conflict over Europe. The same author builds the idea from the supply side this time and investigates the impact of EU issue voting on parties’ electoral success (de Vries 2010). However, some others claimed that the impact of Europeanization on national politics is limited. Mair, for instance, argued that European integration had no clear impact on national party systems (Mair 2000).

If preferences related to European integration play a role in casting a vote, this process can be defined as EU issue voting. Research shows that the degree of
influence of voters’ positions on their vote varies cross-nationally depending both on the issue salience and on the availability of viable offers from the supply side (Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007, de Vries and Edwards 2009).

This work builds on the existing literature, mainly testing the following hypotheses:

H1: The distance between voters and parties on the EU integration scale is expected to have a greater impact on the EP vote during the crisis and in the post-crisis period than before.

H2: As a consequence of the crisis, the impact of LR distance on the EP vote is expected to decrease.

H3: As a consequence of the crisis, the impact of partisanship on the vote is expected to decrease.

As we already know from the literature, in every election, issues, leaders and partisan attachment play an important role while casting a vote. In European Parliament elections, leaders do not play a significant role. Partisan attachment, aka partisanship, is expected to play a role in European Parliament elections, even if the attachment is coming from national politics. When we discuss issues, European Union integration and left/right dimensions are named independent, and orthogonal, since Hix and Lord said the Eurosceptics or Eurocritics exist both on the left and right side of the ideological spectrum based on the study they conducted on voting behaviour of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (Hix and Lord 1997). For this reason, both left/right and European integration dimensions are included in the model. As it is already discussed above, since the economic crisis and its implications have been the main agenda in Southern Europe, it is expected that the explanatory power of European

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4 With Spitzenkandidaten, candidates for the president of the European Commission, this can change in the future. However, for the time being, the impact is limited (Schmitt, H., et al., 2015)
integration distance is increased, while the impact of partisanship and left right dimension is decreased.

**Methodology and data**

In order to examine the relationship between parties’ positions towards European integration and the vote choice in European Parliament elections, individual level survey data from European Election Studies (EES) of 2004, 2009, and 2014 will be employed. EES’s are post-electoral surveys with representative samples in each EU member state (Schmitt, Bartolini et al. 2009, Egmond, van der Brug et al. 2013, Schmitt, Hobolt et al. 2015). The data provides the opportunity to compare Southern European countries, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, across time and analyse similarities and differences in the determination of EP vote choices. EES survey data include information on voters’ self-perceptions and party-perceptions of EU positions as well as left/right positions.

The empirical analysis examines the existence and extent of EU issue voting in European Parliament elections. Within the analysis, a conditional logit (CL) regression model is employed. The data set is “stacked,” reshaping the data matrix from wide to long format for each country separately (Van der Eijk 2002, van der Eijk, van der Brug et al. 2006). The stacked data set includes the left-right and the European integration distances between self and the stack party (calculated as the absolute difference between voter’s self positioning and the positioning of the relevant political party) into a single variables for each.

The dependent variable is party choice, which is a categorical variable with multiple values that requires further clarification in the methodology that is used. In this model, what we are investigating is how the characteristics of political parties (i.e. their positions on European integration relative to voter’s position) can influence the vote choice of that voter within a spatial framework. For this reason a conditional logit is employed instead of a multinomial logit, which focuses on individual voters rather than issue positions of political parties. Therefore, conditional logit is the most suitable model in this analysis.
Following the literature on voting behaviour, the distance between the voter and the party on a given issue is expected to have an impact on the vote casted in an election if that issue is important for the voter. For the purpose of this work, the distance between the self-placement of the voter and her/his perception of the political party is calculated, both for the left-right dimension and the European integration dimension. These two variables are the central predictors of the model, controlled for by partisanship.

Voters’ individual positions and their perceptions of the political party, both for left/right and the European integration dimension, are measured on an 11-point scale running from 0 to 10. For the left/right dimension, 0 means left, while 10 means right. In the case of European integration, 0 means “European integration has already gone too far,” while 10 means “European integration should be pushed further.”

[Table 1 about here]

The full models also include controls for age, gender, education, religiosity and union membership.

**Results**

Table 2 presents the results of the baseline models for Southern European countries at three points in time. As has been said before, the analyses are conditional logit models based on stacked data matrices. According to our preliminary results, a modest impact of EU distance can be seen for only two countries: Italy and Greece.

[Table 2 about here]

If we go deeper into these results, we find that EU distance on vote choices has not significantly increased since 2004. Left-right distance and partisanship
continue to explain voting behaviour in large part. In 2009, right around the time the global economic crisis started, a modest change was observed. EU distance now had a borderline significant impact on the vote in Greece and Italy. It is important to underline, however, that even though the effect is visible, it was only very weak.

**Concluding Remarks**

How have the economic crisis and changes in Europe shaped voting behaviour in elections? In this paper, this question has been assessed using cross-national data from the European Election Studies (2004, 2009, and 2014). Southern European countries, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, have been examined as case studies wherein similarities regarding the economic crisis and the differences in their responses to it have been discussed.

The findings suggest that there are certain differences in the explanatory power of the EU distance variable when we relate it to the vote. In 2004 there was no significant impact related to this variable whatsoever. However, after the crisis began in 2008, the impact became visible in the 2009 elections. Furthermore, it is interesting here to see that this impact is only visible in two countries: Greece and Italy. It is important to underline that the case of even if the impact visible, it was only border line significant. Spain and Portugal have remained immune to the impact of the EU distance variable. So it can mostly be concluded that the EU distance was never really important for our four Southern European crisis countries.

So, what can be the reason for this? Here come some possible explanations. In Southern European countries, EU issues were not considered as EU issues but rather left right issues. Secondly, austerity policies are more of a left right thing rather than a EU thing. To be more concrete, regulations related to the economy fits better in the left right spectrum. For this reason, it is important that the explanatory power of the left right distance has increased in 2014 in Greece.
Bibliography


Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Unemployment rate in Southern European countries (2004-2014)

Source: Author’s self elaboration from Eurobarometer surveys

Figure 2: Youth unemployment rate in Southern European countries (2004-2014)

Source: Author’s self elaboration from Eurobarometer surveys
Figure 3: Government debt in Southern European countries (2004-2014)

Source: Author’s self elaboration from Eurobarometer surveys

Figure 4: Trust in the European Union (2004 – 2014)

Source: Author’s self elaboration from Eurobarometer surveys
Figure 5: Trust in national government (2004 - 2014)

Source: Author’s self elaboration from Eurobarometer surveys
**Table 1: Description of dependent and independent variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Vote choice for a particular party in a given election</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Left/right distance</td>
<td>Operationalized by subtracting a respondent's self-placement from a respondent's party placement on a ten-point ideology scale (where 1 indicates left and 10 indicates right).</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU distance</td>
<td>Operationalized by subtracting a respondent's self-placement from a respondent's party placement on a ten-point European integration scale (where 1 stands for &quot;European unification has already gone too far&quot; and 10 stands for &quot;European unification should be pushed further&quot;).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Respondent's age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Respondent's gender (0=male, 1=female)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>Respondent's church attendance (0=no church attendance, 3=most frequent church attendance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Respondent's level of education (0=low education, 1=high education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>Respondent's union membership (other family members' membership is not included) (1=union member, 0=not union member)</td>
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Table 2: Exploring the interaction between the vote and EU distance (Baseline models - conditional logit estimates)

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<tr>
<td>Left/Right distance</td>
<td>-0.44*** (-0.08)</td>
<td>-0.26*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.48*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.37*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.58*** (0.06)</td>
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<td>EU distance</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.15* (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.96 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.15* (0.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>3.30*** (0.40)</td>
<td>3.22*** (0.24)</td>
<td>3.32*** (0.21)</td>
<td>3.44*** (0.26)</td>
<td>1.90*** (0.23)</td>
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<td>Left/Right distance</td>
<td>-0.44*** (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.31*** (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.23* (0.08)</td>
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<td>Partisanship</td>
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<td>3.33*** (0.30)</td>
<td>3.12*** (0.33)</td>
<td>3.44*** (0.26)</td>
<td>3.55*** (0.47)</td>
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Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is respondent’s vote choice for a particular party in a given election.
*** significant at p<0.001, ** significant at p<0.01, * significant at p<0.05,
### Appendix

**Appendix Table 1: Eurosceptic Parties (Voters’ Average Placed into EP Groups)**

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<td>FPO</td>
<td>Austrian Freedom Party</td>
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<td>19.72</td>
<td>12.71</td>
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<td>VB</td>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>NI</td>
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<td>DPS</td>
<td>Workers Party of Belgium</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>CY</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>UKP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
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<td>10.66</td>
<td>(Coal)</td>
<td>ECR</td>
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<td>Dansk Folkeparti</td>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
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<td>26.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
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<td>Independent</td>
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**Notes:** European Election Study 2014 (for EU integration scores) and EP 2014 official results (for votes, groups and seats).